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A Proposal on the Law of the Sea 
ALEXANDER NADESAN 
Bemidji State College, Bemidji 
ABSTRACT - There has been no agreement until now on the breadth of the territorial sea. This 
study proposes a uniform law on the breadth of the territorial sea. The concept of the three-mile 
limit is reviewed briefly. The question of national security is analyzed and the consequences of 
extending the breadth of the territorial sea beyond six miles is also discussed . 
The Doctrinal Development of Territorial Sea Law 
The subject of the law of the sea is a vital question in 
the mid-twentieth century. The question of the freedom 
of the seas has been a central point in numerous inter-
national disputes since the early history of human civili-
zation. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Dutch 
and the British refused to accept the supremacy of the 
Portuguese and the Spanish who then ruled the vast 
oceans with their mighty naval fleets. 
In 1609, Hugo Grotius published his Mare Liberum 
(Freedom of the Sea) to counteract any claim of mo-
nopoly by one nation to the vast oceans. Grotius' Mare 
Liberum, addressed to "the rulers and the free inde-
pendent nations of Christendom" has been regarded as 
a most important law because of the great expansion of 
commercial enterprise taking place. As a result of ex-
pansion, the new growing nations in Europe, for their 
own interests, preferred the sea to be free for all nations 
instead of being appropriated by the powerful. The cen-
tral thesis of Grotius was that the sea was free for all. 
Grotius stated that no one could gain ownership of a 
property by possession without occupation . The implica-
tion is that since the ocean cannot be occupied effec-
tively, it is res communis (common to all), that is, "be-
longs to no one and open equally to all." 1 
The writing of Grotius was attacked by other writers 
(Grotius was at that time in the minority among the 
writers), one of whom was John Selden. In 1618 Selden 
published his Mare Clausum, stating that parts of the 
sea had actuaHy been appropriated by England. 2 In the 
18th century Grotius' law gained support from van 
Bynkershoek, whose work, De Dominio Maris Disserta-
tio (Freedom of the Seas), was published in 1703.3 
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The Freedom of the Seas. London: Oxford University Press, 
1916, p. 2. 
2. John Selden, Mare Clausum, translated in English, London, 
1662, p. 7. 
3. Cornelius van Bynkershoek, De Dominio Maris Dessertatio, 
English translation by Magoffin. Freedom of the Seas. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1923, p. 13. 
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As a result of the publication of Bynkershoek's work 
at the beginning of the 18th century, the question of the 
appropriation of the sea opened another debate. Bynker-
shoek was concerned in Freedom of the Seas with the 
question of delimitation of the territorial sea immediately 
adjacent to the coast. Bynkershoek recognized the fact 
that the seas could be effectively occupied to the mari-
time belt measured by the range of a cannon shot. 4 
Bynkershoek thus assigned to a state the dominion of 
the adjacent sea (Mare Proximum) within the range of 
a cannon shot from the shore where guns were actually 
in position. Marginal waters were thus subject to pos-
session, occupation and, therefore, ownership. Bynker-
shoek's formula of cannon range was gradually adopted 
by many states in fixing their territorial waters. Since 
there was not a clear agreement among the nations at 
that time on the precise limit of territorial waters, pub-
licists refused to accept the Bynkershoek formula in the 
beginning. It was not until sometime later in the 18th 
century that writers gradually recognized the cannon 
shot limit." 
With the change of doctrine came the change of prac-
tice. The principles of the freedom of the seas and a 
narrow breadth of territorial sea was accepted. By 1900 
the theoretical principle of the three-mile or one league 
limit had been adopted or acknowledged as law by some 
20 states. Even though other states did not acknowledge 
the three-mile limit, they did not contest its validity. It 
may, therefore, be said that at the turn of the century the 
three-mile limit had been accepted as the customary rule 
of international law. A notable exception was the Scan-
dinavian countries who had adopted a four-mile limit of 
territorial waters. 
State Practice from 1930 to 1958 
From 1930 to the 1958 United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, the practice of states in regard to the 
extent of territorial waters in the 20th century had been 
very arrogant in their claim to the limit of territorial wa-
ters. At The Hague Conference on territorial waters, 
States for the first time challenged the rule of interna-
tional law fixing the breadth of the territorial waters at 
three miles. The failure of the 1930 Conference at The 
Hague to set a precise limit on the breadth of the terri-
4. Ibid., Chapter 2. 
5. Emmerick Vattel, Droits des Gens, English translation by 
Charles Fenwick, Classic of International Law. Washington, 
1916, p. 65. Though Vattel did not come forward to support 
the three-mile limit but did support the complete jurisdiction 
of the sea by the costal state. 
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torial sea provoked some states to extend their territor-
ial waters beyond the customary three-mile limit. The 
primary motivation threatening the extension of terri-
torial waters seemed to be the desire for greater con-
trol of fishing. Though some states challenged the law 
they did not extend their territorial waters beyond the 
customary three-mile limit until World War II. The 
large number of states claiming more than three miles of 
territorial waters prior to the Geneva Conference on the 
Law of the Sea did so for the first time after the conclu-
sion of the war. 
The Legal Situation at the Opening of the 19S8 
Geneva Conference on the Territorial Waters 
The increasing use of the sea and the products of the 
sea since World War ll have made it essential that states 
give much greater attention to the question of control of 
territorial waters. The desire to control fishing particu-
larly was probably the motivation behind the action 
taken for extending the territorial waters. On the basis 
of state practice in early 1958, just prior to the Geneva 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, there were no more 
than 27 of the 73 coastal states who claimed a specific 
breadth of territorial sea in excess of three miles. Chile , 
Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru claimed zones of 200 
miles. The disputes over territorial waters were further 
widened at the opening of the Geneva Conference. 
The failure of the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences 
on the Law of the Sea under the auspices of the United 
Nations extended the claims of nations for wider control 
of the sea unilaterally. A major problem of high inter-
national concern involves the question on the breadth of 
the territorial sea. How far seaward should a state's sov-
ereignty extend? Planes and ships have been fired on and 
international incidents over coastal fishing have taken 
place. In recent years, several of the newly independent 
states have unilaterally extended their territorial waters 
to 12 miles. At the present moment 40 states still claim 
three-mile limits; 34 states claim 12-mile limits; 21 
states claim six-mile limits; while others claim four miles 
or more. It seemed now that the basis for claiming wider 
territorial waters - other than fishing for the purpose of 
food - is the question of national security. Growing n::i-
tionalism in the world with tensions also causes many 
nations to extend their territorial waters claims. It is 
probably for prestige that some of the newer states claim 
wider territorial waters in order to keep up with the 
neighboring states. 
A realistic appraisal of the situation would seem to in-
dicate that a change of position in this area in the in-
terest of the world is desirable instead of assertions of 
sovereignty over the immense areas of the high seas. The 
question of the extent of the territorial sea should be 
examined in the light of some of the pertinent arguments 
that have been advanced in favor of extending the three-
mile limit. 
A Proposal on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea 
The principle of the freedom of the seas must be main-
tained without further extending the territorial waters. 
It is, therefore, urgent to find a solution to this problem 
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by enacting a uniform law through international conven-
tion. Unless this is done soon, many of the world's stra-
tegic straits and narrow water channels along the con-
tinental margins and between islands would be converted 
from high seas to territorial waters. Therefore, a pro-
posal for a minimum extension of six miles of territorial 
waters on the breadth of the territorial sea should be al-
lowed to all nations. Such an extension would better 
serve the freedom of the oceans; otherwise there is likely 
to be a continuation of serious international incidents 
and encroachment of the oceans. An extension of the 
territorial sea is proposed here as a solution only after 
an objective analysis reveals that the problem cannot be 
resolved within the context of the concept of res com-
munis or on the reasoning of the traditional three-mile 
limit, and that there is an actual need for extending that 
limit. 
The extension of territorial waters to six miles with-
out further extension will serve the fishing resources ad-
jacent to coastal states. The existing law concerning con-
servation in seas adjacent to foreign states is quite ade-
quate. In fact, the work of the Geneva Conference on 
fish conservation and related matters, if ratified by a suf-
ficient number of states, will in almost all cases eliminate 
whatever legitimate need there might be for an exten-
sion of the territorial sea. 
Furthermore, the law on the continental shelf should 
be adequate for any mineral or other natural resources 
to be claimed. Any claim beyond the six-mile proposal 
of territorial waters does not seem to warrant any justi-
fication. Unilateral claims to sovereignty or other forms 
of exclusive control over waters heretofore recognized 
as high seas cannot be regarded as valid. This is not to 
say that the reasons, legitimate or otherwise, that moti-
vate such claims should be ignored. The remedy is not 
unilateral action; an effort should be made to reach 
agreement on the principles of that law. The complexity 
of the maritime boundary limit issue has also become for 
many a political rather than a legal question. 
Effect upon Shipping 
The extension of territorial waters to more than six 
miles might well create further shipping problems. Efforts 
by merchant ships to avoid violating the regulations of 
the coastal states in areas that are now open to free navi-
gation could well lead to increased shipping costs, less 
profit to the producers of the cargo carried, and higher 
prices to the consumer. The increased shippers' costs 
would thereby be borne by the countries dependent upon 
unhampered sea-borne commerce for their economic ex-
istence, and would particularly affect many of the newly 
independent countries who have favored larger extension 
of the territorial sea. G 
It would be extremely expensive for any state with a 
sizable coastline to patrol adequately more than six miles 
of territorial sea. The United States, for example, has 
estimated that an extension of 12 miles of territorial wa-
ter would necessitate an initial capital outlay of $8 mil-
6. Arthur H. Dean, "The Law of the Sea," Department of 
State Bulletin, 38 (1958), pp. 576-577. 
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lion and an increase in annual operating cost of $1,500,-
000 for each 100 miles of coastline, or an annual in-
crease in expenditure of $180 million for the continen-
tal United States alone.7 The newly developing nations 
cannot meet any extensive costs to patrol their coastlines 
effectively if the territorial sea should be extended to I 2 
miles. If a state effectively patrols its coastlines, there is 
no point in demanding a wider territorial sea; her sov-
ereignty might be violated by other states. 
Effect upon Aircraft 
Unlike ships that sail the seas, aircrafts have no "right 
of innocent passage" over territorial waters. Only above 
the high seas is there an absence of any restrictions per-
taining to sovereign rights. The complicated structure of 
international airways with their technical requirements 
must in all cases conform to the sovereign pattern of land 
and the marginal seas. What would happen to aircraft 
when claim to the ocean is extended to 12 miles? What 
would happen to the safety of air traffic? Each mile in 
the air denied to commercial aircraft - as by demands 
for greater breadth of the territorial sea - offsets that 
much the great advances made by the aeronautical in-
dustry. Planes of one state may fly over the territorial 
sea of another state only by bilateral or multilateral 
agreements, and such accord is by no means always as-
sured in the present-day world. What then is the fear 
of foreign aircraft flying over a state's territory? 
With the extension of territorial waters, aircraft must 
fly many extra miles to avoid overflight of certain sov-
ereign territory. The unreasonable extension of territorial 
waters will only harm commercial aircraft, since military 
aircraft is forbidden to fly over the air space and terri-
torial waters of another state without prior consent, or 
without the risk of anti-aircraft fire. The effect on mili-
tary aircraft, however, would be even more drastic since 
it has no right of innocent passage over straits connecting 
areas of the high seas. 
The Question of National Security 
The law of the territorial sea is linked closely with the 
question of national security of the coastal State. Thus 
the doctrine of the freedom of the seas is not a mere his-
torical relic of the so-called time when maritime law 
was developed; the question of coastal defense was clear-
ly included. The question of national security became an 
important issue both at the 1958 and the 1960 Confer-
ences on the Law of the Sea, and was particularly noted 
by states urging 12-mile limits on contiguous zones, 
aside from problems of fishing, customs control, fiscal, 
immigration, and sanitary controls. The principal diffi-
culty was that a number of the participating delegations 
were wholly unwHiing to accept a six-mile territorial 
sea unless it were to be accompanied by recognition of 
protective controls over the contiguous zone. 
The United States delegate in 1960, referring to the 
question of security, indicated that the adoption of a 12-
mile limit for the territorial sea would restrict the free-
dom of navigation and result in longer trade routes and, 
7. Ibid., p. 577. 
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hence, push up shipping costs and commodity prices. 
This view was challenged by the Soviet delegate, who 
pointed out that the security question of a state is well 
safeguarded by the generally recognized right of inno-
cent passage. "Furthermore, the free passage of ships 
and commercial aircraft along established international 
routes which crossed the waters of foreign States was 
adequately safeguarded in specific multilateral and bi-
lateral agreements which would not be affected by an 
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea." 8 As in-
dicated earlier, the security consideration was also re-
ferred to in support of the opposite policies, that is, the 
older maritime powers saw no objective ground to claim 
the wider extent of the territorial sea for the purpose of 
defending the coastal State. Since the coastal State could 
be defended likewise by not extending the breadth of the 
territorial sea or the contiguous zone as demanded by the 
12-mile bloc for a wider extension. However, some of 
the newly developing states from their past experiences 
indicated that they were fearful of possible approach of 
foreign warships to their off-shore areas. The following 
statements made by the delegates from the developing 
states are worth noting (India): 
1. For purposes of security, the breadth of the terri-
torial sea was immaterial in time of actual hostilities. 
It was in situations short of war that the breadth was 
important to coastal States. Some countries seemed 
to fear that if they were at war they might have 
difficulties in the waters of neutral States with a 
twelve-mile territorial sea. Surely, however, the inter-
ests of coastal States in peacetime took precedence 
over the interests of non-coastal States in time of war. 
2. The domination of smaller countries by the Great 
Powers was still a vivid reality. Small countries were 
fearful of any encroachment by land or sea, particu-
larly of the prolonged sojourn of foreign warships in 
their adjacent waters, and were anxious for that rea-
son to lay down a limit of twelve miles for the terri-
torial sea. It would not help the cause of codification 
of international law if that genuine apprehension 
on the part of small countries was ignored. 8 
Every state naturally wishes to safeguard its national 
security and the well being of its people when determin-
ing the breadth of its territorial sea and fishery limits, 
and due consideration should be given to the needs and 
circumstances of coastal States. In demanding a wider 
territorial sea limit for security, the developing countries 
were also fearful of the "gun boat" diplomacy of the 
great powers from their past experiences. For example, 
the United Arab Republic delegate stated that " ... he 
would emphasize that many small countries were deeply 
apprehensive about the possibility of foreign warships 
and aircraft staging demonstrations of force off their 
coasts." 10 The representative of the U.A.R. also referred 
to such demonstrations as a possible means of intimidat-
ing the coastal States.11 The Iranian representative stated 
8. Second United Nations Conference 011 the Law of tire Sea, 
Official R ecords, A/ Conf. 19 / 8, 1960, p. 39. 
9. Ibid., p. 77; A/ Conf. 19 / SR. 12, 1960, p. 7. 
10. Ibid., p. 102. 
11. A / Conf. 19 / C. I/SR. 17, 1960, p. 3. 
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that "many African, Asian and Latin American States" 
had been subjects of colonialism based mainly on naval 
power. "The tragic memory of the appearance of war-
ships in the coastal sea, threatening any liberation move-
ment in those countries, was still unforgettable." 1 2 
The United States argued against extending the 
breadth of the territorial sea for 12 miles for its own se-
curity interest. The following statements made by the 
Department of State Legal Advisor seem to support it: 
If the territorial sea were uniformly extended out 
to twelve miles, enemy submarines could operate in 
the territorial waters of neutral states with excellent 
chances of remaining undetected. This would be par-
ticularly true of modern submarines with atomic 
power, which are able to remain submerged for long 
periods of time. In time of war our surface ships 
cannot operate on nor can our aircraft fly over terri-
torial waters of neutral States without violating the 
neutrality of these States. 
The dangers presented by an extension of the 
breadth of the territorial sea from a military stand-
point are by no means limited to the perils of sub-
marine warfare. If territorial seas were uniformly ex-
tended out to twelve miles, the operation of our 
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean would be greatly 
circumscribed. The Straits of Gibraltar in their en-
tirety would become territorial waters. . . 1 3 
From the United States' point of view as discussed 
above, for the purpose of security it was unnecessary to 
broaden the territorial sea, since the coastal state exer-
cises complete sovereignty over the belt subject to the 
right of innocent passage, when the basic purpose can 
be served just as well by a limited jurisdiction over an 
additional belt of the contiguous high seas. The United 
States was particularly concerned with the security of a 
nation, but from a completely different aspect; as the 
delegate of the United States to the Geneva Conference 
on the Law of the Sea put it, 
The extension of the territorial sea of neutral na-
tions might in many instances increase the striking 
power of enemy submarines. This is because normally 
submarines cannot safely operate within three miles 
of the shore. However, if the territorial sea were ex-
tended to twelve miles, an enemy submarine (particu-
larly a nuclear submarine which could operate silent-
ly for long periods without surfacing) would be able 
to move about undetected in a neutral State's terri-
torial sea, whereas our surface ships could not oper-
ate there without violating the State's neutrality. 11 
Dean also thought that it would not be advisable to 
restrict maneuvering of the United States fleet as a re-
sult of wider extension of the territorial sea. According 
12. He was referring to the 1958 landing of United States 
marines in Lebanon to defend the country, A/Conf. 19/ 8, 1960, 
p. 104. 
13. Based on a lecture before the American Canne Association 
at Chicago, see Loftus Becker, "The Breadth of the Territorial 
Sea and Fisheries Jurisdiction," Department of State Bulletin, 
40 (March 16, 1960), p. 371. 
14. Arthur H. Dean, "Freedom of the Seas," Foreign Af-
fairs, 37 (1958), pp. 89-90. 
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to Dean, the operations of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediter-
ranean Sea would have been restricted and the landing of 
United States marines in Lebanon would have been le-
gally impossible. The operations of the Seventh Fleet to 
defend Quemoy and Matsu on the Formosa Strait would 
have been considerably hindered if the territorial sea had 
been extended to 12 miles. 1., The United States had also 
indicated at the 1958 Conference on the Law of the 
Sea that the coastal State had some privileges in its ter-
ritorial sea already, without necessarily extending the 
breadth and the contiguous zone to 12 miles. 16 
The same view was also advanced by the Canadian 
delegate at the 1960 Conference who added that "the ex-
tension of the territorial sea beyond . . . adds nothing 
whatever to the ability of any country to defend itself 
under modern conditions." 11 The United Kingdom dele-
gate pointed out, in reference to modern warfare, that 
policing and controlling in the wide territorial sea were 
difficult and costly and that, since it became hard to fix 
precisely the position of ships at sea, the likelihood of 
incidents would be increased and the safety of coastal 
states would be jeopardized as the result.18 This reason-
ing was intended for those states demanding wider ter-
ritorial sea for security purposes. 
The delegate of the Byelorussian Socialist Soviet Re-
public sought to explain the real motives of the United 
States in advocating a narrow territorial sea, rather than 
12 miles of territorial sea, in the following terms: 'The 
main objective of the champions of the six-mile limit 
was to obtain for their naval forces unconditional, so-
called legitimate, access to foreign waters close to coasts 
in which they were interested for strategic or political 
reasons." rn The Byelorussian delegate then quoted the 
statements made by Dean, the chairman of the United 
States delegation to the United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, at the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the United States Senate, on January 20, 1960: 
Our navy would like to see as narrow a territorial 
sea as possible in order to preserve maximum possi-
bility of deployment, transit and manoeuvreability on 
and over the high seas; free from the jurisdictional 
control of individual States. 
There are approximately one hundred sixteen im-
portant international straits in the world which could 
15. This statement is not clear what differences it should 
make legally or otherwise, since the landing of United States 
troops was invited by the Lebanese Government, unless, Mr. 
Dean was implying the movement of the Fleet along the neigh-
boring coastal Slates would have been restricted, if twelve miles 
belt had been claimed by those coastal States. 
16. A. H. Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the 
Sea: What was Accomplished," AJIL, 52 (October, 1958), pp. 
607-61 l; United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
Official Records of the First Committee, A/Conf. 13 / 39, 1958, 
5. 26. 
17. Second United Nations Conference 011 the Law of the 
Sea, Official R ecords, A/Conf. 19/ 8, 1960, p. 50; Official Records 
of the Second United Nations Conference 011 the Law of the 
Sea, Committee of the Whole, Verbatim Records of the General 
Debate, A ! Conf. 1919, 1960, p. 416. 
18. Ibid., p. 56. 
19. Ibid., p. I 05, A/ Conf. 19/C. I/SR. 17, 1960, p. I 3. 
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be the choice of a limit for territorial seas. All would 
become subject to national sovereignties if a six mile 
rule were adopted . . . of the fifty-two straits which 
would become subject to national sovereignties under 
a six mile rule, only eleven would come under the 
sovereignty of States which would appear likely to 
claim the right to terminate or interfere with tran-
sit of our warships or aircraft, while denial of pas-
sage through these eleven straits would present a de-
fense capability impairment, that impairment is be-
lieved to be within tolerable operating limits. On the 
other hand, under the twelve mile territorial sea rule, 
eighteen straits would come under the sovereignty 
of States which possibly would claim the right to 
terminate or interfere with the transit of our war-
ships or aircraft, and, of conclusive importance for 
defense purposes, the denial of passage through these 
additional straits would present for us a completely 
unacceptable impairment of our defensive mobility 
and capability.20 
Some of the delegates observed the United States 
views, as quoted by the Byelorussian delegate, as highly 
important psychological factors in the United States 
proposal for not wanting a 12-mile limit; and therefore, 
they thought more of their national security, but not in 
the terms expressed by the United States. They demand-
ed wider territorial sea for the purpose of defense. On 
the other hand, the 12-mile bloc thought that the mo-
tives behind the United States Government refusal to ac-
cept a 12-mile limit was primarily for defense reasons. 
The following statement seems to support this position: 
A complete analysis and comparison of the effect 
of a six mile versus a twelve mile territorial sea has 
led to the conclusion, concurred in by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, that the United States should strive 
to achieve agreement on as narrow a territorial sea 
breadth as possible, but in any event not to exceed 
six miles. 21 
The United States had also established various security 
zones for its national security against possible surprise 
attack. The Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and 
the Canadian Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ). 
These security identification zones had been put forward 
as zones of control necessary for the self-defense of the 
coastal States. With such zones, vast areas of the oceans 
are covered in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. 22 Al-
20. Statements made before the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the United States Senate on January 20, 1960, by Mr. Dean; see 
"Department Seeks Senate Approval of Conventions on Law 
of Sea," Department of State Bulletin, 42 (January, 1960), pp. 
259-260; Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, op. cit., p. 106. 
21. Dean, in "Department Seeks Senate Approval of Conven-
tions on Law of Sea," op. cit., pp. 260-261. The British were 
also preoccupied with the defense policy, since the United 
Kingdom had experienced in both wars against Germany in 
1914 and in 1939, due to the use of Germany of Norwegian 
neutral territorial waters. See D. W. Bowell, "The Second Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea," International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 11 (1962), p. 416. 
22. McDougal tries lo justify the encroachments on the free-
dom of the seas in the case of experiments near Bikini by in-
voking the necessary self-defense of the United Slates and the 
Journal of, Volume Thirty-four, No. 2, 1967 
though the freedom of flying over the high seas is rec-
ognized by international law, there is, however, danger 
to these security zones because they still restrict aircraft 
of other nationalities flying close to these zones. As Dean 
has said, 
There is no right for aircraft to overfly another 
nation's territorial sea, except under a treaty, with its 
consent, or pursuant to the Chicago Civil Aviation 
Convention of 1944 as to the contracting parties 
there to. 23 
Examples of incidents clearly indicate the danger of 
such zones. Though the United States and Canada were 
not responsible, the Soviet Union had ruthlessly shot 
down United States planes and interrupted commercial 
as well as military planes on the coasts of the Bering 
Sea and the Kurile Islands. 2·1 
In pursuance of the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone, a State may not create a special 
security zone adjacent to the territorial sea, restricting 
the navigation of foreign vessels . Especially during peace-
time, claims to security zones could lead to the destruc-
tion of the principle of the freedom of the seas. Even 
Bulgaria introduced a proposal at the 1958 Conference 
that "the coastal State shall not use the continental shelf 
for the purpose of building military bases or any instal-
lations which are directed against other states." 25 This 
proposal was defeated together with an Indian proposal 
of similar nature.26 The Convention on the Continental 
Shelf purposely did not deny the right of the coastal 
state to build defense installations on its continental 
shelf. However, it is quite clear to expect that such de-
fense installations as those permitted for conservation to 
result "in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, 
fishing or the conservation of the living resources of the 
sea . . ,, 21 
The result would be complete chaos if every state 
fearful of aggression by other states could extend its 
sovereignty arbitrarily over parts of the high seas. More-
over, it is questionable whether in view of recent techni-
cal and scientific developments, a security zone is of sig-
nificant strategic value. The following statement is il-
lustrative: 
When we recall that three miles once provided 
military security because it was the distance of can-
non shot from shore, and reflect that missile range is 
now five thousand miles or even more, it appears 
likely that the maintenance of a belt of territorial 
free world. See McDougal, et. al., "The Hydrogen Bomb 
Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security," Yale Law 
Journal ( 1954-55), p. 648; see also J. A. Martial, State Control 
of the Air Space over the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone," Canadian Bar Review (1952), pp. 245-263. 
23. A. H. Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the 
Sea: What was Accomplished," op. cit., p. 607, footnote 8. 
24. For various incidents as described by the Soviets for violal• 
ing their security zone, see New York Times, July 17, 1960 
p. 5, E; ibid., July 22, 1960, p. 1; ibid., June 16, 1960, pp. 45, 48. 
25. A/Conf. 13/C. 4/L. 41, 1958. 
26. A/Conf. 13/C. 4/L. 57, 1958. 
27. Ibid., article 5, par. I. 
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seas for military purposes is unnecessary or even 
impossible. . . . 2 8 
Conclusion 
The extension of the territorial sea of neutral nations 
in time of war might in many instances increase the strik-
ing power of enemy submarine~ ~ince, norn~ally, sub-
marines cannot safely operate within three miles of. the 
shore. If the territorial sea were extended to 12-miles, 
an enemy submarine, particularly a n~clear _submarine 
that could operate silently for long penods without _sur-
facino would be able to move about undetected m a 
neutr';;l states' territorial sea. Therefore, the argument 
that extension of the territorial sea is necessary in order 
to provide for national defense does n_ot seem _to be v~ry 
convincing. Most states have great difficulty m_ meetm_g 
their obligations as neutrals within a three-mile terri-
torial sea. 
As a matter of fact, the Scandinavian countries had 
retreated from four miles to three miles in time of war, 
and Norway's failure, early in World War II, ~o per-
form its obligations within three miles actually pre1ud1ced 
its neutrality. During the winter of 1939-1940, Germany 
evaded a British blockade by moving Swedish iron ore 
through Norwegian waters from Narvik, Norway, to the 
mouth of the Baltic. 29 Norway, however, was unable to 
prevent German submarines _from s_ink!ng British and 
neutral vessels within Norwegian terntonal waters. Eng-
land had to mine the Norwegian waters, thus forcing 
Germany to use the high seas. The g~eat~st weakness, 
therefore in the argument that the terntonal sea should 
be extended for purposes of defense in the interest of_ the 
coastal state to 12 miles does not seem to be logical. 
The advances of modern technology, including the inter-
continental ballistic missile, are merely additional proof 
of the fact that the problem of defense cannot be solved 
in terms of miles of territorial sea. 
Insofar as the breadth of the territorial sea is con-
cerned, many of the United Nations ~elegates had_ little 
or no inclination to discuss or consider the ments of 
various proposals as principles of int~rn~tional la:W. or 
as methods for meeting new needs w1thm the ex1stmg 
framework of international law. Moreover, the practice 
28. Lawrence W. Wadsworth, "The Changing Concept of the 
Territorial Seas," World Affairs, 123 ( 1960), p. 69. 
29. See Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1948, p. 531. 
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of bloc voting was another factor that tended to discour-
aoe states from supporting any proposal. The entire Arab 
bloc was committed for political reasons to support the 
12-mile limit in the hope that it might enhance their 
ability to legally close off the Gulf of Aqaba, which is 
less than 24 miles in breadth at its widest point. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the demands of 
coastal states for security purposes have been already 
satisfied to some extent by some legal institutions other 
than the contiguous sea zone. When a foreign vessel is 
detected in the act of some offense within the territorial 
sea the institution of "hot pursuit," which has been rec-
og~ized by Article 23 of the Convention on the High 
Seas, permits pursuit and capture of the vessel ?n the 
high seas. Besides, there are conventions or treaties ~-
tween states for protection of smuggling or other act1v1-
ties. It can also be argued that if a state's security is in 
danger of infringement of its legitimate interests, t?e 
territorial sea belongs to the coastal state as a part of its 
territory already. The right of innocent passage was safe-
ouarded in Section III of the Convention on the Terri-
;orial Sea and the Contiguous Zone adopted in 1958. 
Whether a state seeks a six-mile belt of territorial sea 
or a 12....,mile belt of territorial sea, it seems that neither 
limitation is very pertinent to security because modern 
nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines are capable of 
doing all the destruction without approaching the shore 
of a State. 
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